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6 posts

• Least Privilege for AI Agents: Runtime Capability Minimization and Reducing Blast Radius

  Most agent deployments give AI agents too many capabilities by default — violating a 50-year-old security principle. A concrete framework for enumerating required capabilities, scoping tool access by task, sandboxing execution environments, and auditing capability creep to reduce blast radius.

  Jul 14, 2026 agent-security least-privilege defense-patterns tool-use threat-modeling owasp langchain sandboxing capability-minimization

• AI Secrets Management: Protecting API Keys, System Prompts, and Model Credentials in Production

  API keys for model providers have a blast radius unlike traditional credentials. System prompts encode proprietary business logic that teams rarely treat as secrets. This is a practical guide to treating AI credentials as the first-class secrets they are — with concrete patterns for storage, rotation, agent scoping, and incident response.

  Jul 13, 2026 defense-patterns credential-management secrets-management least-privilege agent-security monitoring incident-response api-security system-prompt cicd

• Non-Human Identity Security for AI Agents: Credential Scoping, Token Lifecycle, and Agent Impersonation

  AI agents are becoming major credential holders and API consumers. Non-human identity (NHI) security treats agent tokens with the same rigor as human credentials — and getting this wrong creates exploitable privilege escalation paths that traditional IAM never anticipated.

  Jul 9, 2026 agent-security credential-management least-privilege iam identity threat-modeling multi-agent zero-trust

• Multi-Agent Trust Escalation: How Subagents Inherit and Abuse Orchestrator Permissions

  Multi-agent architectures introduce a trust escalation problem analogous to privilege escalation in OS security. When orchestrators delegate permissions to subagents, the attack surface multiplies. This post maps the attack classes, draws the OS and service-mesh analogies, and offers concrete defenses.

  Jun 29, 2026 agent-security multi-agent trust privilege-escalation least-privilege threat-modeling

• The Confused Deputy Problem in LLM Tool Use: Why Agents Need Least-Privilege APIs

  A 1988 operating systems paper describes exactly the threat model facing LLM agents with OAuth integrations. Classic infosec's confused deputy maps onto AI tool use in ways most developers haven't internalized — and the mitigations that follow from it aren't the ones getting deployed.

  Jun 28, 2026 agent-security tool-use prompt-injection least-privilege defense-patterns threat-modeling

• Defense-in-Depth for AI Agents — A Security Architect's Stack

  Securing an AI agent isn't one control — it's a stack. A structured guide to layering security controls across the full agent architecture, from model selection through orchestration, tool execution, and output validation.

  Jun 26, 2026 agent-security defense-in-depth threat-modeling architecture least-privilege prompt-injection