Tagged:
architecture6 posts
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Multi-Agent Orchestration Security: Trust, Delegation, and Inter-Agent Attack Surfaces
When Agent A delegates a task to Agent B, the security properties of the entire system reduce to the weakest trust model in the chain. This post maps the attack taxonomy unique to orchestrator-worker architectures — privilege escalation, agent impersonation, confused deputy, tool-chain hijacking — and pairs each with concrete defenses grounded in published research.
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Circuit Breakers for AI Agents: Designing Controllability, Action Budgets, and Emergency Stops
Your agent will eventually get confused. The question is whether it fails safely or catastrophically. Here are the engineering patterns — borrowed from distributed systems and adapted for AI agents — that make the difference.
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Defending Against Prompt Injection: Privilege Separation, Structured Outputs, and the Limits of Current Defenses
No single control stops prompt injection — but layering four concrete patterns (privilege separation, structured outputs, instruction hierarchy, spotlighting untrusted content) gives defenders a workable stack. This post synthesizes what actually works, and is honest about what remains unsolved.
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Zero-Trust Architecture for AI Agent Deployments: Never Trust, Always Verify — Even Your Own Agents
Zero-trust was designed for human users on networks. AI agents break its assumptions: they act autonomously, spawn child agents, inherit permissions, and run long-lived sessions. Here's how to adapt zero-trust principles specifically for multi-agent and LLM deployment contexts.
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Defense-in-Depth for AI Agents — A Security Architect's Stack
Securing an AI agent isn't one control — it's a stack. A structured guide to layering security controls across the full agent architecture, from model selection through orchestration, tool execution, and output validation.
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AgentBridge Attack Surface Analysis: When the Mesh Layer Becomes the Threat
Protocol translation bridges for AI agents look like infrastructure plumbing. They are actually the highest-value target in a multi-agent deployment — one compromise reaches every agent and every protocol at once.