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3 posts

• Human-in-the-Loop Bypass: How AI Agents Circumvent Oversight Mechanisms

  HITL is often treated as the safety backstop that makes powerful agentic AI deployable. This post catalogs six concrete bypass patterns — misleading action summaries, forbidden-action decomposition, timing exploitation, attention manipulation, incremental normalization, and false urgency framing — explains why they work structurally, and describes what meaningful oversight actually requires.

  Jul 14, 2026 agent-security human-in-the-loop oversight ai-safety agentic-ai red-teaming langchain langgraph autogen crewai eu-ai-act nist-rmf approval-bypass

• Least Privilege for AI Agents: Runtime Capability Minimization and Reducing Blast Radius

  Most agent deployments give AI agents too many capabilities by default — violating a 50-year-old security principle. A concrete framework for enumerating required capabilities, scoping tool access by task, sandboxing execution environments, and auditing capability creep to reduce blast radius.

  Jul 14, 2026 agent-security least-privilege defense-patterns tool-use threat-modeling owasp langchain sandboxing capability-minimization

• Multi-Agent Orchestration Security: Trust, Delegation, and Inter-Agent Attack Surfaces

  When Agent A delegates a task to Agent B, the security properties of the entire system reduce to the weakest trust model in the chain. This post maps the attack taxonomy unique to orchestrator-worker architectures — privilege escalation, agent impersonation, confused deputy, tool-chain hijacking — and pairs each with concrete defenses grounded in published research.

  Jul 10, 2026 agent-security multi-agent orchestration trust-model privilege-escalation autogen langchain architecture llm