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3 posts

• Least Privilege for AI Agents: Runtime Capability Minimization and Reducing Blast Radius

  Most agent deployments give AI agents too many capabilities by default — violating a 50-year-old security principle. A concrete framework for enumerating required capabilities, scoping tool access by task, sandboxing execution environments, and auditing capability creep to reduce blast radius.

  Jul 14, 2026 agent-security least-privilege defense-patterns tool-use threat-modeling owasp langchain sandboxing capability-minimization

• How Anthropic Contains Claude — Multi-Environment Sandboxing Architecture

  Anthropic published a rare deep-dive into how Claude is sandboxed across three different products — claude.ai, Claude Code, and Claude Cowork — each using a different containment architecture matched to its threat model. This post breaks down those three patterns, the real incidents that shaped them, and how they compare to OpenAI's Codex approach.

  Jun 21, 2026 agent-security sandboxing defense-patterns anthropic vm-isolation tool-use

• Running Codex Safely at OpenAI — Sandboxing Patterns

  OpenAI's Codex runs every model-generated command inside an OS-enforced sandbox before it touches your filesystem or network. This post breaks down the layered isolation model — platform mechanics, approval flows, auto-review, and cloud isolation — and what each layer actually prevents.

  Jun 20, 2026 agent-security sandboxing defense-patterns openai tool-use