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5 posts

• Poisoning the Knowledge Base: Adversarial Document Injection into RAG Vector Stores

  RAG can be weaponized by anyone who can write to the corpus. This post maps the attack taxonomy — two empirically validated classes (PoisonedRAG, BadRAG), one extrapolated operational pattern, and persistent corpus injection — with real-world ingestion surfaces and a defender checklist.

  Jul 8, 2026 rag rag-security vector-stores adversarial-ml threat-modeling defense-patterns prompt-injection

• Prompt Injection in Long-Context Windows: When More Context Means More Attack Surface

  Extended context windows (128K–1M tokens) introduce an underappreciated prompt injection attack surface: injected instructions buried deep in retrieved documents, conversation histories, or tool outputs can override system prompts or hijack reasoning far from the visible top of the context. This post maps the threat, explains why attention geography matters for defenders, and offers a practical mitigation checklist.

  Jul 2, 2026 prompt-injection long-context rag-security agent-security threat-modeling llm-security

• Shadow Prompting: How Hidden System Instructions Hijack AI Behavior

  Hidden system-level instructions can silently override how an AI application behaves — without the user ever seeing the manipulation. This post explores what makes shadow prompting possible, how it differs from ordinary prompt injection, and what architectural choices actually reduce the risk.

  Jul 1, 2026 prompt-injection context-window rag-security llm-security multi-agent agent-security

• Poisoning the Well: Memory and RAG Attacks Against Long-Context AI Systems

  As AI agents gain persistent memory through vector stores and RAG pipelines, a new attack surface emerges: injecting malicious content into the agent's long-term knowledge to control future behavior. This post maps the taxonomy of memory poisoning attacks — from retrieval manipulation to cross-session contamination — and what defenders need to audit before production.

  Jun 27, 2026 rag-security memory-poisoning prompt-injection vector-stores agent-security threat-modeling

• No Auth Required: How a Healthcare RAG Chatbot Leaked 1,000 Patient Conversations

  Researchers used nothing but Chrome DevTools to extract the system prompt, full RAG configuration, knowledge base, and 1,000 stored patient conversations from a live medical chatbot. The exploit wasn't prompt injection — it was basic web application security failure.

  May 4, 2026 rag-security deployment-security privacy healthcare threat-modeling