Tagged:
privacy15 posts
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Cross-Tenant Data Leakage in Multi-Tenant LLM Deployments: Incidents, Architecture, and What to Demand from Providers
When an LLM service hosts multiple customers on shared infrastructure, failures in conversation isolation, prompt cache sharing, or conversation history storage can expose one customer's data to another. This post covers the documented failure modes, the March 2023 ChatGPT Redis incident, batch inference and system prompt bleed risks, and what enterprise architects should demand from LLM providers before trusting them with sensitive data.
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Prompt Cache Timing Attacks: Side-Channel Leakage in LLM API Infrastructure
Major LLM providers cache prompt prefixes to reduce latency and cost — but shared cache infrastructure creates a timing side-channel. An attacker with access to a shared API key or multi-tenant deployment can measure whether a specific prefix is cached, leaking information about co-tenant system prompts and conversation context within the same cache namespace.
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Model Inversion Attacks: Reconstructing Private Training Data from Model Confidence Scores
A model's output probability scores are not neutral summaries — they encode information about the training data that produced them. Model inversion attacks exploit this to reconstruct representative training examples from API-level confidence values. This post covers the foundational Fredrikson et al. work, black-box and GAN-based variants, conditions for vulnerability, and how to distinguish this class from membership inference and training data extraction.
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Privacy-Preserving AI Inference: Trusted Execution Environments, Homomorphic Encryption, and Confidential Computing
When you submit a medical record to an AI API, can the cloud operator read it? TEEs, homomorphic encryption, and secure multi-party computation provide cryptographic and hardware-enforced confidentiality. This post explains what each actually guarantees — and what it doesn't.
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Training Data Extraction: How Attackers Query LLMs to Surface Memorized Private Content
LLMs verbatim-memorize chunks of their training data, and a simple prefix-completion attack can surface phone numbers, email addresses, code, and cryptographic identifiers that appeared in the training corpus — no model internals required. This post covers the mechanics, landmark empirical results, and the practical defenses that actually reduce extraction risk.
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Differential Privacy in Practice: What the Math Guarantees (and What It Doesn't) for AI Training Data
Differential privacy is the strongest mathematical privacy guarantee for ML training data — but the gap between formal ε-DP and deployed reality means many 'private' AI systems aren't nearly as private as advertised. This post bridges the math and the practice.
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Membership Inference Attacks: Detecting What Was in an AI Model's Training Data
Membership inference attacks let adversaries determine—with significant accuracy—whether a specific data record was used to train a model. This post covers the attack mechanisms, why models leak this information, real-world threat scenarios, and how differential privacy and machine unlearning address (and fail to fully close) the gap.
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Gradient Inversion Attacks: Reconstructing Private Training Data from Model Updates
Gradients are not safe summaries of training data. In federated learning and fine-tuning pipelines where model updates are shared, a malicious aggregator can run gradient inversion to recover original training samples with alarming fidelity — and the defenses have hard limits.
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RAG Privacy Attacks: How Retrieval-Augmented Generation Pipelines Leak Private Documents
RAG makes LLMs accurate by indexing private documents — but the retrieval pipeline introduces a new attack surface. Adversarial queries can extract document chunks, embedding inversions recover original text, and multi-tenant isolation can fail in ways that expose documents across access boundaries.
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Machine Unlearning Security: When Forgetting Training Data Creates New Vulnerabilities
Regulators are demanding AI systems forget specific training data. Attackers are figuring out how to weaponize that forgetting — through verification gaps, induced forgetting abuse, and unlearning as a path to alignment degradation.
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Federated Learning Poisoning: The Aggregation Attack Surface
FL aggregation is blind to participant intent. Malicious clients can embed backdoors or reconstruct private training data from gradients.
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VEGA: Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Digital Identity in the Age of AI Agents
Microsoft Research's VEGA system generates cryptographic proofs from government credentials in 92ms — letting AI agents verify identity facts without ever seeing the underlying document.
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1,000 Breaches Later: The Disclosure Lag Is Worse Than Ever
Troy Hunt's HIBP milestone analysis shows breach disclosure times are lengthening, not shrinking — driven by class-action fear, legal posturing, and regulatory carve-outs. The same dynamics will shape how AI incidents get disclosed.
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The Privacy Cost of CAPTCHA-Free Browsing: Cloudflare Turnstile and WebGL Fingerprinting
Cloudflare Turnstile promises a frictionless, CAPTCHA-free experience — but achieving that invisibly requires collecting a detailed hardware fingerprint via WebGL. Understanding what's traded for that convenience matters for anyone building or operating systems that respect user privacy.
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No Auth Required: How a Healthcare RAG Chatbot Leaked 1,000 Patient Conversations
Researchers used nothing but Chrome DevTools to extract the system prompt, full RAG configuration, knowledge base, and 1,000 stored patient conversations from a live medical chatbot. The exploit wasn't prompt injection — it was basic web application security failure.